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Based on a comprehensive investigation into the nature and evolution of the global 
rendition system, this paper seeks to provide an account of the extent of British 
involvement in and knowledge of that system. It shows that UK authorities have been 
complicit in a wide range of human rights violations associated with rendition, secret 
ĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ?hƐŝŶŐ^ƚĂŶůĞǇŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌĞǆƉůĂŝŶŝŶŐŚŽǁƐƚĂƚĞƐĚĞŶǇ
involvement in and knowledge of atrocities we demonstrate the various ways that the 
UK government sought to cover up both its knowledge of the system, and its role within 
it. The paper is also aimed at offering some insights into how we have undertaken the 
research into these highly secretive practices. The paper begins by setting out the key 
elements of the global rendition system. It then explains how each of those elements 
violates various human rights conventions before going on to examine the extent of 
British involvement, and the lengths the British government went to in denying both 







On 17 September 2001, President George W. Bush sent a 14-page memo to the Director of the CIA 
ƉĞƌƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞWƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůŽĨ ‘ĐůĂŶĚĞƐƚŝŶĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚĂŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĨŽƌ
ƚŚĞ/ ?ƐƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ ‘ƚĞƌƌŽƌŝƐƚĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽŐƌĂŵ ? ?tŚŝůĞƚŚĞ memo remains 
classified, the topic of the memo was disclosed in January 2007 when the CIA filed a declaration to 
the Courts insisting that it was too sensitive for release, following an attempt by the American Civil 
Liberties Union to obtain its release through Freedom of Information legislation. Within weeks of 
issuing the memo, President Bush issued an Executive Order on the Detention, Treatment and Trial 
of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Bush 2001). This Order provided the 
Department of Defense (DoD) with the authority to detain indefinitely any non-American in the 
world, in any place in the world, as long as they were determined by the US Government to pose a 
terrorist threat to US interests. Together with the September 2001 memo to the CIA, this Order laid 
the foundations for the development of a global system of rendition and secret detention, as well as 
the official military detentions in Afghanistan and Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.  
 
As part of our wider research, we have sought to provide the most comprehensive account to date 
of the global rendition system, rolled out by the Bush administration. It has involved dozens of 
countries on 5 continents, over 100 aircraft, and hundreds of victims. Importantly, many elements of 
the system are still intact. As well as involving the torture of terror suspects, the global rendition 
system features a number of practices that are prohibited by international human rights and 
international humanitarian law, some of which, in and of themselves constitute a form of torture, 
such as prolonged arbitrary, incommunicado detention. It is our contention that by examining the 
wider architecture of the global rendition system, we gain greater insight into the extent and 
seriousness of British involvement in a wiĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨŚƵŵĂŶƌŝŐŚƚƐǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?hƐŝŶŐ^ƚĂŶůĞǇŽŚĞŶ ?Ɛ
framework for explaining how states deny involvement in and knowledge of atrocities (Cohen 2001) 
we demonstrate the various ways that the UK government sought to cover up both its knowledge of 
the system, and its role within it. The paper is also aimed at offering some insights into how we have 
undertaken the research into these highly secretive practices. The paper begins by setting out the 
key elements of the global rendition system. It then explains how each of those elements violates 
various human rights conventions before going on to examine the extent of British involvement, and 
the lengths the British government went to in denying both knowledge of the system and complicity 
in it.  
 




Rendition is not a term defined by international law, and as such there are various understandings of 
what the term means. At the heart of all definitions, however, is the movement of detained persons 
across state boundaries in a manner which is outside of any legal framework, for example, legal 
extradition proceedings. Building on attempts that have been made to scope out various sub-
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝĞƐŽĨƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞh<WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ
Committee (ISC 2007), we consider the following to be substantive types of rendition: rendition to 
                                                          
1
 dŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐƉĂƉĞƌǁĂƐĨƵŶĚĞĚďǇĂŐƌĂŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh< ?ƐĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽƵŶĐŝů ?(RES-000 W22 W
4417: The Globalisation of Rendition and Secret Detention). As part of the research we have produced The Rendition 
Project website, which provides access to our Rendition Flights Database and Interactive Map, as well as comprehensive 
analysis of the global rendition system, and access to hundreds of declassified documents and investigative reports 
released over the last ten years. See: www.therenditionproject.org.uk  
Our thanks to colleagues who offered helpful comments and suggestions when an earlier draft of the paper was presented 
ĂƚƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ?Ɛ^ĐŚŽŽůŽĨWŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚ/Z^ĞŵŝŶĂr Series.   
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justice; military rendition; and extraordinary rendition. Rendition to justice involves the transfer of 
persons from one jurisdiction to another for the purposes of standing trial within an established and 
recognised legal system. This form of rendition was used by the US during the Reagan and Clinton 
administrations, usually to apprehend terror suspects and try them in the US, but was largely 
ĚŝƐĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĚĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶƚĞƌƌŽƌ ?ĂƐŽƚŚĞƌĨŽƌŵƐŽĨ ƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĞǆƉĂŶĚĞĚ (Boys 2011; 
Satterthwaite and Fisher 2006). Military rendition involves the extra-judicial transfer of persons 
(detained in or related to a theatre of military operations) from one state to another, for the 
purposes of official military detention in a military facility. Those subjected to military rendition are 
not held in secret, although the legality of their capture, transfer and continued detention may be 
disputed. Their treatment, including interrogation methods employed, may also contravene 
international and domestic law. The transfer of hundreds of battlefield detainees from Afghanistan 
(and the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region) to Guantánamo Bay, via US Department of Defense-
run facilities in Afghanistan, are instances of military rendition, as are the transfer of battlefield 
detainees from Iraq to detention facilities in other states. Extraordinary rendition refers to the extra-
judicial transfer of persons from one jurisdiction or state to another, where this involves the capture 
and transfer outside of the recognised theatres of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, or where it 
otherwise involves transfer to secret detention outside of the normal legal system. Those subjected 
to extraordinary rendition include all those moved between states as part ŽĨƚŚĞ/ ?Ɛ
Counterterrorism Center Program, and held in CIA-ƌƵŶ ‘ďůĂĐŬƐŝƚĞƐ ? ?ƐĞĐƌĞƚĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶŽD facilities, 
and proxy detention sites. It also includes those captured outside of Iraq and Afghanistan (including 
the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region) and transferred directly to official military detention in 
Guantánamo Bay, Iraq or Afghanistan. 
 
dŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůŽŐŝĐƐďĞŚŝŶĚ ‘ĞǆƚƌĂŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞ firstly, to facilitate the secret detention of a 
terror suspect, and secondly, to exclude the possibility of review by the domestic courts of the US or 
the home country of the detainee. Through Bush ?Ɛ Executive Order on the Detention, Treatment, 
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (Bush 2001), individuals detained 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞKƌĚĞƌ ?ŬŶŽǁŶĂƐ ‘ĞŶĞŵǇĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ ?, need not be tried, but when they were to be, this 
should be by military commission. The Order also allowed for the detention of individuals at an 
appropriate location designated by the Secretary of Defense outside or within the US. It was this 
Order that paved the way for the arbitrary detention of thousands of detainees in Afghanistan and 
Iraq at sites intended for this purpose, including at the Bagram Airbase, Afghanistan, and the Abu 
Ghraib prison, Iraq, as well as for military rendition and extraordinary rendition (Bush 2001). The 
third reason for carrying out extraordinary rendition was that it was assumed that foreign agents 
might gain useful intelligence, through interrogations that involved torture, that could be passed 
back to US intelligence agents. A leaked memo from a special agent of the FBI, sent in November 
2002, warned ƐĞŶŝŽƌ&/ƐƚĂĨĨƚŚĂƚƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ‘ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ?ĨŽƌƵƐĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
Guantánamo detainees would violate US law on torture. As Sattherthwaite and Fisher explain, the 
memo makes clear that the purpose of rendition is to subject detainees to illegal interrogation 
ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐĂƐĂŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝŶŐŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ?/ƚƐƚĂƚĞƐ ?‘ĞƚĂŝŶĞĞǁŝůůďĞƐĞŶƚŽĨĨ'dDK [the US 
detention facility at Guantánamo Bay], either temporarily or permanently, to Jordan, Egypt, or 
another third country to allow those countries to employ interrogation techniques that will enable 
ƚŚĞŵƚŽŽďƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƐŝƚĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ?The author of the FBI memo then warns that any such 
action would violate Article 18, §2340 [the criminal torture statute] of the US Code (Satterthwaite 
and Fisher 2006: 59). Despite this warning, rendition of detainees by the CIA to third countries 
known to use torture continued throughout the Bush presidency, even though the CIA Inspector 
General concluded in 2004 that the value of using torture was of negligible value in the quest for 
intelligence (Blakeley 2011; CIA 2004a). Furthermore, rendition to countries where torture is 
common has continued under the Obama administration.  We think that between 150 and 200 
people have been subjected to extraordinary rendition, and this was recently confirmed by research 
carried out by the Open Society Justice Initiative, which has attempted to identify all known victims 
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of extraordinary rendition (OSJI 2013). However, because of the secrecy of the practice, the numbers 
may be higher.  
 
 
The rendition process 
 
Typically, the CIA, working with the intelligence agencies of other states, would identify individuals it 
wished to apprehend and transfer to a third party state and would then facilitate the rendition. This 
would either be in response to intelligence it received from other states about particular individuals 
thought to be involved in terrorist organisations, or individuals that the CIA had itself identified. 
Arrangements would be made for a rendition team to travel to the location where an individual had 
been apprehended by local authorities, on board one of a fleet of civilian aircraft which were either 
owned by the CIA (via nominally independent shell companies), or were contracted out to the CIA by 
private companies. Sometimes, the CIA team would collect an individual or group of intelligence 
personnel from the countries to which the individual target would eventually be handed over, to 
assist with the pick-up.  
ĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ǁĂƌŽŶƚĞƌƌŽƌ ?ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚďĞƚǁĞĞŶŵĂŶǇƐƚĂƚĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?
However, accounts of the rendition process itself, as recounted by the detainees, are consistent. 
The Marty investigation, launched by the Council of Europe to investigate the complicity of European 
states, ĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƌĞƚŽďĞĂŶ ‘ĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚ modus operandi of rendition, put into practice by an elite, 
highly-trained and highly-ĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞĚŐƌŽƵƉŽĨ/ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ? (Marty 2006, 2007). Detainee accounts 
consistently mention that those conducting the transfer were dressed completely in black, with full 
face masks and black gloves. Most communication was conducted via hand signals. Prior to the 
ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌ ?ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐǁŽƵůĚďĞƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽĂ ‘ƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶƉŚĂƐĞ ? ?Žƌ ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇĐŚĞĐŬ ? ?dŚŝƐǁĂƐ
described to the Marty investigation ďǇĂ/ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĂƐĂ ‘ƚǁĞŶƚǇŵŝŶƵƚĞƚĂŬĞŽƵƚ ? ?designed to 
ƌĞĚƵĐĞƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƚŽ ‘ĂƐƚĂƚĞŽĨĂůŵŽƐƚƚŽƚĂůŝŵŵŽďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƐĞŶƐŽƌǇĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐǁŽƵůĚ
be stripped, often by having their clothes cut from their body. They would be gripped from all sides 
throughout the process, and often punched, kicked or shoved. When naked, they were 
photographed, and be subjected to a full cavity examination. Suppositories were often administered 
anally, before being dressed in a diaper and a tracksuit or boiler-suit (jump-suit). Detainees were 
then blindfolded, sometimes after having cotton wool taped to their eyes. Headphones or ear 
defenders were placed on their ears, sometimes with loud music played through them. Loose hoods 
were then placed over the head, which reached down over the shoulders. Hands and feet were 
shackled, and may then have been connected to other detainees. During transfer, detainees were 
generally chained to a stretcher, a mattress, or the floor of these aircraft, either spread-eagled or 
with their hands behind their backs. No toilet breaks were provided, with detainees required to 
defecate or urinate into their diapers. 
 
Working closely with the UK legal action charity, Reprieve, and various other human rights 
organisations, we have compiled all available flight data in the public domain which relates to those 
aircraft suspected of involvement in the global network of rendition and secret detention. We now 
have a comprehensive dataset containing flight data relating to 121 US-registered civilian aircraft 
that have been the focus of inquiry by one or more inter-governmental, governmental or non-
governmental bodies. It also contains records on some military flights into and out of Guantánamo 
Bay. It contains over 13,000 flight records relating to those aircraft. This dataset has helped us to 
closely analyse the infrastructure that supported the global rendition network, and to identify 
patterns in the way in which renditions occurred. The database can be accessed via an interactive 
map on the Rendition Project website.
2
 Used alongside the investigative work of human rights 
litigators and investigators, this data is important in helping us gain a fuller picture of the 
                                                          
2
 Ruth Blakeley and Sam Raphael (2013), The Rendition Project website, http://www.therenditionproject.org.uk/  
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involvement of the various states that played a part, as well as the roles of the private companies 
from which aircraft were supplied and logistics facilitated. Our analysis of the flight data, alongside 
documentary analysis of the numerous human rights investigations undertaken by international, 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, has meant we are able to ascertain the levels of 
involvement of Britain in rendition, secret detention and torture. Before exploring British 
involvement, we will first outline how various elements of rendition violate international law.  
 
Rendition, Secret Detention, Torture and International Law 
 
We draw on academic work in the field of International Law, where a small number of scholars have 
examined the various ways in which rendition violates various international treaties and conventions 
on human rights (Parry 2005; Sadat 2007; Satterthwaite 2006; Satterthwaite and Fisher 2006; 
Satterthwaite 2007b, 2007a; Weissbrodt and Bergquist 2006).  As these scholars have shown, the 
rendition and/or secret detention of a detainee necessarily entails multiple violations of their human 
rights, as codified in the national law of many states, as well as in international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law. Despite attempts by the Bush administration to legitimise these 
violations by carving out an extra-legal space within which the detainees could be held and 
interrogated, legal experts from around the world are overwhelmingly of the opinion that these 
practices are illegal. In some cases they may ĞǀĞŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞ ‘ǁĂƌĐƌŝŵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐƌŝŵĞƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ
ŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ? ? Specifically, extraordinary rendition and the accompanying detention in secret violate the 
following: the prohibition of arbitrary detention; the right to a fair trial; the prohibition of torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment; and the prohibition of enforced 
disappearance.  
 
Secret detention necessarily violates the rights to liberty and freedom from arbitrary detention 
guaranteed by Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
Paragraphs 1 and 4 are of particular relevance:  
 
1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to 
arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty except on such 
grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by law. 
4.  Anyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take 
proceedings before a court, in order that that court may decide without delay on the 
lawfulness of his detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful. 
(UN 1976) 
 
The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention has identified three categories of arbitrary detention, 
and has concluded in a number of cases of rendition victims that their secret detention falls under 
Category  ? ? ‘tŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽůĞŐĂůďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨůŝďĞƌƚǇ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇ ‘had not been 
formally charged with any offence, informed of the duration of their custodial orders, brought 
before a judicial officer, allowed to name a lawyer to act on their behalf, nor otherwise been 
provided the possibility to challenge the legality of their detention ?(UN 2010: 15).  
 
With regard to the right to a fair trial, where persons are held secretly without an intent to promptly 
charge with a crime, or to inform them of any charge, or to bring before an independent tribunal 
where guilt/innocence can be established, such practices violate Article 14 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), together with Article 9.  
 
dŚĞƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝůůŝĐŝƚĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨƚĞƌƌŽƌƐƵƐƉĞĐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ?ŚĂƐůĞĚƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ?
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment of many detainees, either while held and 
interrogated by the CIA or by US Department of Defense personnel, or by states acting for the US. 
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Secret detention has also been found to be a primary facilitator in the commission of acts of torture. 
/ŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ƚŚĞ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞŚĂƐƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŽŐƵĂƌĂŶƚĞĞƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝŽŶ
of detained persons, provisions should be made for detainees to be held in places officially 
recognised as places of detention and for their names and places of detention, as well as names of 
persons responsible for their detention, to be kept in registers readily available and accessible to 
ƚŚŽƐĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ? (UN 1992). 
 
The various violations of human rights that the global rendition system has involved have occurred 
despite the fact that the US and many of its partners in the global rendition system are signatories to 
the Geneva Conventions, the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR). Torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment are all prohibited 
under each of these Conventions. There is no derogation from this prohibition, even in times of war. 
Secret detention is itself a form of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment, and even 
torture. The Human Rights Council have found many such cases to be in violation of Articles 7 and 10 
of the ICCPR.   
 
Every instance of secret detention is an instance of enforced disappearance, and this is explicitly 
outlawed by the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance (UN 2006). Article 7 makes the direct link, in law, between enforced disappearance 
and secret detention. When practiced on a systematic basis, enforced disappearance can amount to 
ƚŚĞŵŽƐƚŐƌĂǀĞŽĨĐƌŝŵĞƐƵŶĚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ PĂ ‘ĐƌŝŵĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŚƵŵĂŶŝƚǇ ?. 
 
Complicity in rendition and secret detention may mean that states fall foul of international laws 
concerning non-refoulement and the requirement that states are in no way accessories to human 
rights violations. Indeed they have certain responsibilities to prevent those violations. For 
example, under the Convention Against Torture, states have obligations to try to prevent torture by 
other parties. The transfer of an individual to another state where there is a risk that the individual 
faces torture is prohibited. The Convention Against Torture explicitly states this in Article 3: 
 
No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being 
subjected to torture. 
(UN 1985) 
 
While the ICCPR does not contain an explicit clause of non-ƌĞĨŽƵůĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞhE ?Ɛ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ
Committee has interpreted Article 7 as including an obligation of non-refoulement. In its general 
comment  on The Nature of the General Legal Obligation on State Parties to the Covenant in 2004, 
the Committee stated: 
 
Moreover, the article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the 
Covenant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails 
an obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their 
territory, where there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of 
irreparable harm, such as that contemplated by articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either 
in the country to which removal is to be effected or in any country to which the person 
may subsequently be removed. 
(UN 2004) 
  
The US has tried to get round the non-refoulement obligation by arguing that the ICCPR only applies 
to individuals within the US. Yet article 2 states: 
7 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant. 
 (UN 1976) 
 
The US interprets this as meaning that individuals have to be within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction. This is at odds with the UN ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐĞĞƐƚŚĞ
Covenant as being applicable to individuals either ŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇor subject to its jurisdiction. 
In other words, as Satterthwaite  explains, there are two separate bases for the application of the 
norms (Satterthwaite 2007b). The first is the effective control over territory. The second is the 
existence of power over an individual. With regard to territory, the Human Rights Committee 
interprets this to mean not just the sovereign territory of a state, but also territory that is under 
 ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ŽĨƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?dŚŝƐĐĂŶŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƚĞƌritory of other states under military 
ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĨŽƌĐĞƐĂƌĞŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶĂŵƵůƚŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ
operation. With regard to the existence of power over an individual, the Human Rights Committee 
finds that the Covenant ĂƉƉůŝĞƐƚŽĂŶǇŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐĂďĚƵĐƚĞĚŽƌĂƌƌĞƐƚĞĚďǇĂƐƚĂƚĞ ?ƐĂŐĞŶƚƐĞǀĞŶŝĨ
this occurs outside the state. Thus, even if the transfer of a detainee originated in territory that was 
not under US control, if US agents were involved, they would be in violation of the Covenant. 
It is clear that rendition itself violates international human rights law, as do a number of the 
accompanying practices that have become key features of the global rendition system. The 
remainder of this paper is aimed at evaluating the extent to which Britain has colluded in the global 




Britain has colluded in rendition in a number of ways, some of which have come to light only very 
recently. As such, the UK has violated numerous articles of international law aimed at protecting 
human rights. Collusion by Britain has taken a number of forms. UK authorities have passed 
questions to those involved in interrogations of individuals that have been subjected to rendition, 
secret detention and torture. UK authorities initiated renditions of individuals to Libya, which were 
then facilitated by the CIA and resulted in the arbitrary detention and torture of viĐƚŝŵƐďǇ'ĂĚĚĂĨŝ ?Ɛ
regime. UK territory has been used for the refuelling of aircraft involved in renditions. UK authorities 
have shared intelligence with the US and other states which has led to the rendition and secret 
detention of detainees. UK authorities have received intelligence obtained during the interrogation 
of individuals that have been subjected to rendition, secret detention and torture. UK intelligence 
agencies have been informed by detainees that they have been subjected to torture and have failed 





Despite overwhelming evidence that the UK knew a great deal about the rendition programme, and 
that UK security and intelligence agencies were involved in it, UK authorities repeatedly denied 
knowledge of it and complicity iŶŝƚ ?tĞĚƌĂǁŽŶŽŚĞŶ ?ƐĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬĨŽƌƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƚŚĞǀĂƌŝŽƵƐ
mechanisms of denial that states use to cover up knowledge of and involvement in atrocities. Cohen 
distinguishes between the ways that the public responds to knowledge of atrocities and what he 
ĐĂůůƐ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĚĞŶŝĂů ? ?tŚĞŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĚĞŶŝĞƐĂƚƌŽĐŝƚŝĞƐŽƌƐƵĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞĚĞŶŝĂůƚĞŶĚƐƚŽďĞĂ
ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ‘ĨŽƌĐŽƉŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŐƵŝůƚ ?ĂŶǆŝĞƚǇŽƌŽƚŚĞƌĚŝƐƚƵƌďŝŶŐĞŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ
ĂƌŽƵƐĞĚďǇƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ? (Cohen 2001: 5). When states deny atrocities or suffering, this tends, by contrast, 
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ƚŽďĞĂĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŝŶĚŝƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ůǇŝŶŐĂŶĚĐŽǀĞƌƵƉ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐ ‘ĐǇŶŝĐĂů ?ĐĂůĐƵůĂƚĞĚĂŶĚ
ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ? (Cohen 2001: 6). Cohen suggests that authorities have three possibilities as to what is 
ďĞŝŶŐĚĞŶŝĞĚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐ ‘ůŝƚĞƌĂl ĚĞŶŝĂů ? ? ‘ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚŝǀĞĚĞŶŝĂů ? ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝŵƉůŝĐĂƚŽƌǇĚĞŶŝĂů ? (Cohen 
2001: 7).  
 
Literal denial involves asserting that something did not happen or is not true (Cohen 2001: 7). It may 
also involve efforts to go on the counter-offensive by smearing those who allege wrong doing 
(Cohen 2001: 112-13). Interpretive denial involves giving a different meaning to the facts from what 
seems apparent to others, rather than stating outright that something is not true (Cohen 2001: 7). 
This might involve suggesting that an incident was isolated rather than systematic (Cohen 2001: 61). 
It might involve denying responsibility by claiming that an act was accidental (Cohen 2001: 60), or by 
suggesting that some other party is responsible (Cohen 2001: 61). It might involve euphemism 
(Cohen 2001: 107), for example, the Bush administration coined the term  ‘ĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ
ƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ?ƚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞǁŚĂƚŽƚŚĞƌƐǁŽƵůĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚĂƐƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ?It might also involve recourse to 
legalism (Cohen 2001: 107), a device also used by the Bush administration, which sought to argue 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ'ĞŶĞǀĂŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶƐĚŝĚŶŽƚĂƉƉůǇƚŽĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞ ‘tĂƌŽŶdĞƌƌŽƌ ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇ
ǁĞƌĞ ‘ĞŶĞŵǇĐŽŵďĂƚĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƉƌŝƐŽŶĞrs of war. Finally, implicatory denial involves neither 
the denial of facts nor the interpretation of those facts. Rather it involves the denial or minimisation 
of the psychological, political or moral implications that conventionally follow from the events in 
question. This often involves the rationalisation of state actions (Cohen 2001: 8).  For example, US 
officials in recent years have repeatedly argued that the indefinite detention without charge or trial 
of detainees in Guantánamo Bay is not as serious as opponents of the policy suggest, since the 
detainees in question are extremely dangerous, and therefore, the abuse of their human rights is 
minor issue compared with the risks they pose to US citizens if released. It might involve denial of 
the victim, perhaps by arguing that the injury to a victim was not wrong in the circumstances (Cohen 
2001: 61). /ƚŵŝŐŚƚŝŶǀŽůǀĞƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽ ‘ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝǌĞƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐĨƵůŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĂĐƚďǇŵŝŶŝŵŝǌŝŶŐĂŶǇ
ƌĞƐƵůƚĂŶƚŚƵƌƚŽƌŝŶũƵƌǇ ? (Cohen 2001: 61). It might also involve appeals to the righteousness of the 
actor or indeed the act, or to necessity (Cohen 2001: 110). It might also involve appeals to the 
exceptional nature of the circumstances, or it might involve making advantageous comparisons with 
other, less savoury actors (Cohen 2001: 111). 
 
Denial is often a collective endeavour, involving group think, whereby a collective understanding of 
specific actions emerges (Cohen 2001: 66), and whereby mechanisms develop within organisations 
for insulating certain individuals or groups from knowledge of wrongdoing. These can include 
ensuring that knowledge is compartmentalised so that individuals do not have the full picture 
(Cohen 2001: 86). It can also involve ensuring that individuals conform, for example by not 
questioning when they discover wrongdoing (Cohen 2001: 91).  Since political denial often involves 
quite complex webs of collusion, it can be difficult to ascertain who knew what, when. Unravelling 
knowledge of rendition within the UK state apparatus is no exception, as we will see.   
 
 
UK authorities in denial 
 
After evidence emerged that renditions related aircraft had landed on UK territory, UK authorities 
were repeatedly asked about British involvement in rendition and alleged complicity in torture. The 
h<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƚǇƉŝĐĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞǁĂƐƚŽƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚthe UK unreservedly condemns torture or cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment, that it does not participate in it, solicit it, encourage or condone it, 
for any purpose, and claims to abide by its commitments under international law (JCHR 2009: Ev. 33-
4). This repeated response is an obvious example of literal denial.  UK officials also engaged in 
interpretive and implicatory denial. Numerous examples of this are seen in oral evidence given to 






Jack Straw stated before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee ? ‘We know of no 
occasion where there has been a rendition through UK territory, or indeed over UK territory, nor do 
ǁĞŚĂǀĞĂŶǇƌĞĂƐŽŶƚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚƐƵĐŚĨůŝŐŚƚƐŚĂǀĞƚĂŬĞŶƉůĂĐĞǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŽƵƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? (UK 2005). 
This was a case of literal denial. He went further though, stating that,  ‘Unless we all start to believe 
in conspiracy theories and that the officials are lying, that I am lying, that behind this there is some 
kind of secret state which is in league with some dark forces in the United States, and also let me 
say, we believe that Secretary Rice is lying, there simply is no truth in the claims that the United 
<ŝŶŐĚŽŵŚĂƐďĞĞŶŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚŝŶƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĨƵůůƐƚŽƉ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞǁĞŚĂǀĞŶŽƚďĞĞŶ ? (UK 2005). Thus, as 
well as denying UK involvement in rendition, Jack Straw was quick to smear those making the 
ĂůůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐ ‘ĐŽŶƐƉŝƌĂĐǇƚŚĞŽƌŝƐƚƐ ? ? 
 
In the same session before the Foreign Affairs Select Committee, Straw also offered comments that 
suggest he was engaging in interpretive denial. For example, he admitted to having approved two 
requests from the Clinton administration to carry out two renditions to justice during his time as 
Home Secretary, stating that he had been satisfied about the nature of the likely treatment they 
would receive on arrival in the US. He was therefore admitting that renditions had occurred but was 
asserting that these were qualitatively different from what was being alleged, since these were 
renditions to justice, not to torture. He did not acknowledge that both are illegal under international 
law. By pointing to this very small number of cases, he was also implying that these had been 
isolated incidents and in no way linked to any systematic programme of UK complicity in rendition. 
As we will show, however, nine months before Straw gave his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Select 
Committee, UK security services were involved in orchestrating renditions to torture of a number of 
>ŝďǇĂŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ&ĂƌĂƐƚƚŽ'ĂĚĚĂĨŝ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?
 
Former Prime Minister Tony Blair continued to deny any UK involvement in rendition, long after 
leaving office, and after compelling evidence had proved the opposite to be true. As Gaskarth 
explains, in an interview in 2010, continued to claim not to know anything about rendition and 
ƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐ ‘/ ?ŵŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĐŽŶĚĞŵŶƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐ/ƌĞĂůůǇĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁĂďŽƵƚ ? ?zĞƚ ?ĂƐ'ĂƐŬĂƌƚŚ
shows, he was made aware of the allegations of torture against victims of rendition during his time 
in office, as early as February 2004 (Gaskarth 2011: 961).  
 
We explore a number of specific cases to demonstrate the various ways in which the UK has been 
involved. We also demonstrate where denials by UK authorities have proven to be false, or where 
UK authorities knew full well that there was a risk of numerous human rights violations, but either 
actively encouraged a course of events that would result in those, or did nothing to stop them.  
 
 
Renditions initiated by UK authorities 
 
The UK has initiated renditions from Asia to Libya, as indicated by the so-called Tripoli documents. 
These were documents formerly held by the Libyan intelligence chief, Musa Kusa, and obtained by 
Human Rights Watch on 3 September 2011, just after the fall of the Gaddafi regime, and explained in 
detail in their report, Delivered into Enemy Hands (HRW 2012).  
 
UK intelligence services appear to have initiated the rendition of Abdel Hakim Belhadj (also known as 
Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq) and his pregnant wife, Fatima Bouchar, from Bangkok to Libya, in early March 
2004. Belhadj had left Libya in 1988 and during the 1990s became leader of the Libyan Islamic 
&ŝŐŚƚŝŶŐ'ƌŽƵƉ ?>&/' ? ?ĂŝŵĞĚĂƚŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁŝŶŐŽůŽŶĞů'ĂĚĚĂĨŝ ?ƐƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?
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Throughout the 1990s, the LFIG was involved in an ongoing insurgency in Libya, although by 2001 
this had been crushed and Belhadj was based in Afghanistan. After 9/11, Belhadj fled Afghanistan, 
marrying Fatima Bouchar in 2003 and settling first in Malaysia before moving to China. In early 2004, 
shortly after Fatima became pregnant, they suspected they were being monitored by the 
authorities, and decided they should seek asylum in the UK. On 21 February 2004 they were 
detained at Beijing airport, detained for a couple of days, and then deported back to Malaysia. Afraid 
of being deported to Libya, on arrival at Kuala Lumpur Belhadj claimed that he was an Iraqi refugee 
and wished to claim refugee status. The couple were then detained and interrogated in Kuala 
Lumpur for two weeks. 
The Tripoli Documents show that British Security Services knew of their detention in Malaysia and 
arranged with the Libyan and American services to render Belhadj and Bouchar back to Libya. On 1 
March, a week after the two had been sent to Malaysia, MI6 sent a fax to the office of al-Sadiq 
<ĂƌŝŵĂ ?,ĞĂĚŽĨ>ŝďǇĂŶ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞŵŽĨĞůŚĂĚũ ?ƐĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ 
(MI6 2004b) ?dŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐĂůƐŽǁĞƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇĂǁĂƌĞŽĨĞůŚĂĚũ ?ƐǁŚĞƌĂďŽƵƚƐ ?ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐƚŝƉƉĞĚŽĨĨďǇ
the British, and arranged for him and Bouchar to be rendered back to Libya. On 4 March, the CIA 
sent two memos to the Libyan security services. The first memo, Urgent Request Regarding the 
Extradition of Abdullah al-Sadiq from Malaysia ?ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐǁĞƌĞ ‘ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ
energetically with the Malaysian government to effect the extradition of Abdullah al-Sadiq [Belhadj] 
ĨƌŽŵDĂůĂǇƐŝĂ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ŽŶĐĞǁĞŚĂǀĞ^ĂĚŝƋŝŶĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ?ǁĞǁŝůůďĞǀĞƌǇŚĂƉƉǇƚŽƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
ǇŽƵƌĚĞďƌŝĞĨŝŶŐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚǁĞǁŝůůƐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚǇŽƵ ? (CIA 2004f). The memo 
went on to request that the Libyans refrain from exĞƌƚŝŶŐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞŽŶƚŚĞDĂůĂǇĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ‘ƵŶƚŝůǁĞ
ŚĂǀĞĐƵƐƚŽĚǇŽĨ^ĂĚŝƋ ? ? The second memo from 4 March, Clarification Regarding the Rendition of 
Abu Abdullah al-Sadiq ?ŵĂĚĞŝƚĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵƌƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ƚŚĞ/ ?ŝƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĚ ŽƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
terrorist Abu Abdullah al-^ĂĚŝƋƚŽǇŽƵƌĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞ ‘ǀĞƌǇŚŽƉĞĨƵůĨŽƌĂ ?ƐŝĐ ?
ĞǆƉĞĚŝƚŝŽƵƐƌĞƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚŝƐŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? (CIA 2004g).  
 
Two follow-up memos were then sent from the CIA to Libyan intelligence on 6 March. The 
first, Planning for the Capture and Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq, informed the Libyans that the 
Malay authorities were planning to put Belhadj and Bouchar on a commercial flight from Kuala 
Lumpur to London via Bangkok the next day, on 7 March (CIA 2004e) ?/ƚǁĞŶƚŽŶƚŽƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞ
are planning to arrange to take control of the pair in Bangkok and place them on our aircraft for a 
flight to your ĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?/ƚĂůƐŽƌĞƋƵĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨ>ŝďǇĂŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ
rendition (CIA 2004e).  The second memo from 6 March, headed Schedule for the Rendition of 
Abdullah al-Sadiq ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚ ‘ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƌĞŐĂƌĚƚŽƚŚĞƵƉĐŽŵŝŶŐƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ>/&'
leave Abdulla al-^ĂĚŝƋĂŶĚŚŝƐǁŝĨĞƚŽǇŽƵƌĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ? (CIA 2004d). The memo listed the flight plans for 
the rendition circuit, including for an overnight in the Seychelles for which the Libyan officers 
ĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƚĞĂŵǁĞƌĞĂĚǀŝƐĞĚƚŽ ‘ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽƉĞƌĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?dŚĞĨůŝŐŚƚƉůĂŶƐ
also included a refuelling stopover in Diego Garcia on return from Thailand, with the detainees on 
board. The memo ǁĂƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞh^ŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƐǁŝůůĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽǀĞƌƚŚŝƐŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞ
ĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐĂƌĞƌĞŵĂŶĚĞĚƚŽǇŽƵƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶdƌŝƉŽůŝ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽƵƌƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐƐƚŝƉƵůĂƚĞƚŚĂƚǇŽƵƌ
officers refrain from bringing weapons of any type, cameras, cell phones or recording devices on 
ďŽĂƌĚƚŚĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ? ? 
  
dŚĞƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĞůŚĂĚũĂŶĚŽƵĐŚĂƌĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞĨŽůůŽǁĞĚƚŚĞďƌŽĂĚƉůĂŶůĂŝĚŽƵƚŝŶƚŚĞ/ ?Ɛ
memos to Libyan intelligence, although the precise dates may have varied. They were released from 
detention in Malaysia at some point in the first week of March, and told they could travel to the UK. 
The flight they were placed on, however, stopped in Bangkok on the way to London, and they were 
ďŽƚŚĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĚĂŐĂŝŶŝŶƚŚĞĂŝƌƉŽƌƚ ?ƐǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƌŽŽŵ ?ƚƚŚĂƚƉŽŝŶƚ ?they were handed over to US agents 
and detained in what they believe was a secret prison in or near to the airport. The exact location of 
the facility is unclear. In legal papers filed against the British Government, Bouchar has testified that 
she was drivĞŶ ‘ĨŽƌĂďŽƵƚ ? ?ŵŝŶƵƚĞƐ ?ŝŶĂƚƌƵĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƉƌŝƐŽŶ (Day 2011). However, in an interview 
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with a Human Rights Watch researcher ?ĞůŚĂĚũĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŝƐĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐŝƚĞĂƐ ‘ĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌŽŽŵŝŶƚŚĞ
ĂŝƌƉŽƌƚŝŶĂŶŐŬŽŬ ? (HRW 2012), and according to an interview with The Guardian, they both arrived 
ƚŚĞƌĞ ‘ǁŝƚŚŝŶŵŝŶƵƚĞƐŽĨďĞŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĚ ?ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐůŽĐĂƚĞĚǁŝthin the perimeter of Don 
DƵĂŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂŝƌƉŽƌƚ ? (Cobain 2012). 
 
Regardless of the location of the detention site (or indeed sites), Belhadj and Bouchar were 
separated. Both detainees report being held, interrogated and tortured in Bangkok for five to six 
days. However, this appears to be inconsistent with, on the one hand, the 6 March CIA memo to 
Libyan intelligence which claimed that they were being moved from Malaysia to Thailand on 7 
March (CIA 2004e) and, on the other hand,  flight data for the aircraft which rendered the two from 
Thailand to Libya (which landed in Libya with the detainees on board at some point before or on 9 
March). These flight movements would suggest a detention in Thailand of only 1-2 days. It may be 
that Belhadj and Bouchar were confused about the length of time they were kept in Thailand. Or, 
perhaps more likely, the CIA may have provided the Libyans with misinformation on 6 March, with 
Belhadj and Bouchar being moved several days earlier to allow for a longer period of American 
interrogation before being returned to Libya. Indeed, Belhadj has told Human Rights Watch that 
they were moved to Thailand on 3 March (HRW 2012). 
On either 8 or 9 March, Belhadj and Bouchar were rendered to Libya. Analysis of flight data by 
Reprieve and the Rendition Project demonstrates that the couple were rendered on board the CIA-
owned Boeing 737 with registration number N313P. Eurocontrol and Federal Aviation 
Administration data shows that this aircraft had flown from the US to Libya on 7 March, and was 
back in the country on 9 March, from where it continued onwards to conduct a second rendition 
(of Yunus Rahmatullah and Amanatullah Ali from Iraq to Afghanistan). The CIA memo 
headed Schedule for the Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq, both confirms the other sources of data and 
ĂůƐŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĚĞƚĂŝůƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚ ?ƐŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚƐďĞƚǁĞŶ ?-9 March. According to this memo, the 
aircraft picked up the detainees from Bangkok and departed at 23:30 GMT. It then flew to the British 
island of Diego Garcia, landing after four hours. At this stopover, the aircraft took on 10,000 gallons 
of fuel, before departing again at 05:30 GMT and landing in Tripoli 11 hours later.  
KŶĂƌƌŝǀĂůŝŶdƌŝƉŽůŝ ?ĞůŚĂĚũĂŶĚŽƵĐŚĂƌǁĞƌĞĚƌŝǀĞŶƚŽDƵƐĂ<ƵƐĂ ?Ɛ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ƉƌŝƐŽŶŝŶ
TajourĂ ?<ƵƐĂǁĂƐ'ĂĚĚĂĨŝ ?Ɛ,ĞĂĚŽĨ>ŝďǇĂŶ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞ ? ?ŽƵĐŚĂƌǁ ƐŬĞƉƚďůŝŶĚĨŽůĚĞĚĂŶĚďŽƵŶĚ
for several more hours on arrival at the prison. Within four days, her interrogations began, twice per 
day for 2-3 hours at a time. She was psychologically tortured and refused a medical examination for 
2 months. The doctor explained that she and the baby were very weak and that her womb was too 
dry to allow proper movement for the baby. She was finally released on 21 June 2004, although was 
not permitted to leave the country, and gave birth to her son on 14 July (HRW 2012). 
Belhadj remained in Tajoura for four years. He was tortured repeatedly, including beatings, sleep 
deprivation to the point of delirium, being hung from walls and subjected to psychological torture.
3
 
He was held in solitary confinement, in a tiny dark cell, and refused permission to bathe for three 
years. Moreover, he says that he was interrogated by American and British agents, and those from 
other European countries. In an interview with The Independent, Belhadj described being 
interrogated by three British agents over two sessions (Sengupta 2011). The two men and a woman 
would question him for two hours at a time, and would focus on members of the LIFG based in the 
UK and their links with al Qaeda, which he denied. He describes trying to alert them to his torture at 
the hands of the Libyans: 
 
I hoped they would do something about it. I was too terrified during the meeting to say 
out loud what was being done to me because I thought the Libyans were taping what 
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was going on. When the Libyan guards left I made sign movements with me hands. The 
British people nodded, showed they understood. They showed this understanding several 
times. But nothing changed, the torture continued for a long time afterwards.  
 
The involvement of British and American intelligence in the interrogations of Belhadj is corroborated 
by the Tripoli Documents. Indeed, one of the 6 March memos discussing the upcoming rendition, 
headed Planning for the Capture and Rendition of Abdullah al-Sadiq, is clear that providing American 
access to the detainee was to be a quid pro quo for the CIA effecting his ƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƚĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚ ‘ǁĞ
also appreciate your allowing our service direct access to al-Sadiq for debriefing purposes once he is 
ŝŶǇŽƵƌĐƵƐƚŽĚǇ ? (CIA 2004e). 
 
Once Belhadj and Bouchar were detained in Tajoura, the CIA sent two memos seeking to arrange 
access for American agents. One memo from the CIA to Libyan intelligence, undated and untitled, 
ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞƐĂƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůĨŽƌƚŚĞƚǁŽƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƚŽďƵŝůĚŽŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŶĂƐĐĞŶƚŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďǇ
ƚĂŬŝŶŐ ‘ĂŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĞƉŝŶĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ/ƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŝŶ
>ŝďǇĂ ? (CIA 2004c). It also states that: 
 
We are also eager to work with you in the questioning of the terrorist we recently 
rendered to your country. I would like to send to Libya an additional two officers, and I 
would appreciate if they could have direct access to question this individual. Should you 
agree, I would like to send these two officers to Libya on 25 March. 
 
In a separate memo, dated 17 March and headed Travel to Libya, the CIA made arrangements for 
ƚŚĞƚǁŽĂŐĞŶƚƐƚŽƚƌĂǀĞůƚŽƚŚĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇŽŶ ? ?DĂƌĐŚƚŽ ‘ĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ? (CIA 2004b). 
Although the individual is not named in either memo, the dates discussed strongly suggest that they 
are referring to the rendition and interrogation of Belhadj. 
 
Likewise, the Tripoli Documents include a memo from Mark Allen, who was then Director of 
Counterterrorism at MI6, to his counterpart in Libya, Musa Kusa (MI6 2004a). Dated 18 March, it 




Most importantly, I congratulate you on the safe arrival of Abu Abd Allah Sadiq 
[Belhadj]. This was the least we could do for you and for Libya to demonstrate the 
remarkable relationship we have built over the years. I am so glad. I was grateful to you 
ĨŽƌŚĞůƉŝŶŐƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌǁĞƐĞŶƚŽƵƚůĂƐƚǁĞĞŬ ?ďƵ ?ďĚůůĂŚ ?ƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽŶƚŚĞ
situation in this country is of urgent importance to us. Amusingly, we got a request from 
ƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐƚŽĐŚĂŶŶĞůƌĞƋƵĞƐƚƐĨŽƌŝŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶĨƌŽŵďƵ ?ďĚůůĂŚƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
AŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ?/ŚĂǀĞŶŽŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶŽĨĚŽŝŶŐĂŶǇƐƵĐŚƚŚŝŶŐ ?dŚĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞŽŶďƵ ?ďĚ
Allah was British. I know I did not pay for the air cargo. But I feel I have the right to deal 
with you direct on this and am very grateful for the help you are giving us. 
 
As well as directly interrogating Belhadj, documents unearthed by The Mail on Sunday from the 
abandoned British Embassy in Tripoli ĂŶĚŵĂƌŬĞĚh<^ĞĐƌĞƚŝŶĐůƵĚĞ ‘ůŽŶŐůŝƐƚƐŽĨƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚ
background intelligence that MI5 and MI6 asked Libyan interrogators to put to Mr Belhadj during 
ƐĞƐƐŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞŚĞĐůĂŝŵƐŚĞǁĂƐďĞŝŶŐƚŽƌƚƵƌĞĚ ? (Taher and Rose 2012). 
 
After about four years in Tajoura, Belhadj was convicted in court for armed insurrection against the 
regime, in a trial where the only evidence allowed was a report from the Libyan security services, 
and where he did not have a chance to talk with a lawyer. Although he was sentenced to death, and 
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fully expected that this would be carried out, he was in fact transferred to the Abu Salim prison. 
Here he was held in isolation and in the dark, and continued to be beaten. When he agreed to 
ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞŝŶĂ ‘ĚĞ-ƌĂĚŝĐĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůŝĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ? his conditions improved. He was finally 
released on 23 March 2010, six years after his initial capture. 
In a case very similar to that of Belhadj and Bouchar, the Tripoli documents, as explained by Human 
Rights Watch, also show that MI6 initiated the rendition of Sami Mostefa al-Saadi, along with his 
wife and four children, from Hong Kong to Libya, via Bangkok, on or about 28 March 2004. In 
ĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ŚĂǀŝŶŐƐƵĞĚƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌD/ ? ?ƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŚŝƐƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?Ăů-Saadi 
accepted £2.23 million from UK government in compensation in an out of court settlement. 
Nevertheless the UK government, despite making the settlement, refused to accept any liability. The 
settlement does raise important questions about what was known by senior government officials, 
what evidence there is of UK involvement, the extent to which that involvement was sanctioned at 






Use of UK territory for the refuelling of aircraft involved in renditions 
 
Flight data obtained and analysed by Reprieve and the Rendition Project indicates that aircraft 
carrying rendition victims have made re-fuelling stops on the British island of Diego Garcia in the 
Indian Ocean. For example, Mohammed Saad Iqbal Madni was rendered from Jakarta, Indonesia to 
Egypt on 10-11 January 2002. He had been detained in Jakarta at the request of the CIA. He was 
transferred on board one of the CIA's own Gulfstream V jets, with the registration number N379P, 
and flown to Egypt where he was tortured for three months before being rendered again to 
Afghanistan, and then finally Guantánamo Bay. The aircraft stopped for refuelling en route between 
Indonesia and Egypt, landing on the British island of Diego Garcia with Madni on board.  
N379P left its home base of Johnston County Airport in the afternoon of 9 January, just several hours 
after Madni had been arrested in Jakarta. It flew first to Washington Dulles International Airport, 
where it stayed for just over an hour. It then flew direct to Cairo, landing in the middle of the night. 
The aircraft disappears from the flight records at this point, reappearing six days later on 15 January, 
where it leaves Cairo in the morning and flies to Glasgow Prestwick, Washington and then on to 
Johnston County, arriving just before midnight. Although there are no flight records documenting 
the whereabouts of N379P between 9-15 January, other evidence points to this aircraft having flown 
from Egypt (where it had landed to pick up Egyptian agents) to Indonesia in order to pick up Madni, 
before returning to Cairo with Madni on board, stopping off for fuel in Diego Garcia on the 
way. Madni has testified that he was put onto a plane in the evening of 10 January and taken to 
Egypt (Reprieve 2009). Indonesian officials speaking to the Washington Post (Chandrasekaran and 
Finn 2002) have stated that this aircraft was a Gulfstream V jet, matching the description of N379P. 
 
After 5-7 hours in the air, the aircraft stopped for 30 minutes, during which time he was 
photographed but kept on the plane. It then took off again, flying for a further 3-4 hours before 
landing in Cairo in the morning of 11 January. Analysis conducted by Reprieve has demonstrated that 
the stopover location was almost certainly Diego Garcia (Reprieve 2009). This matches with the 
flying times provided by Madni, the distances involved, and the known speed of a Gulfstream V. It is 
also confirmed by a letter from then UK Foreign Secretary David Miliband to Reprieve's Director 
Clive Stafford Smith in February 2008 ?ǁŚĞƌĞŚĞĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚƚŚĂƚĂ ?ƉůĂŶĞǁŝƚŚĂ detainee on board had 
refuelled in Diego Garcia in January 2002 (Milliband 2008). There is no other known detainee 
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transfer at that time whose route would have taken them via Diego Garcia, meaning that it is highly 
likely that the detainee in question was Madni. 
 
Once N379P landed in Cairo on 11 January, it stayed on the ground until for four days before 
heading back to the US. Madni himself has testified that masked men were present during a series of 
long interrogations by Egyptian agents on 11-12 January. These masked men did not speak, but 
passed notes with questions to the Egyptians. It is therefore possible that these men were part of 
the renditions team who had transferred Madni to Egypt, and who left the country on board N379P 
on 15 January. 
Later that year, the same aircraft flew completed a circuit that made several stops on the way, 
undertaking multiple renditions to transfer detainees between several destinations, including Diego 
Garcia. Specifically, it is likely to have rendered Ramzi Binalshibh from Afghanistan to continued CIA 
detention in Morocco, and two other detainees  W Hassan bin Attash and Abu Otaibi Hadarami  W from 
Afghanistan to proxy detention in Jordan. This circuit is also likely to have involved the rendition of a 
detainee from Southeast Asia to Egypt, via Diego Garcia. N379P left its home base of Johnston 
County Airport in the evening of 11 September 2002, the same day that Ramzi Binalshibh and 
Hassan bin Attash were captured in Karachi, Pakistan. After stopping for about 90 minutes in 
Washington Dulles International Airport, the aircraft flew to Athens, Greece, arriving early in the 
morning of 12 September. It then stayed in Athens for 24 hours, potentially awaiting instruction as 
the handover of Binalshibh and bin Attash to the CIA was being negotiated. 
In the morning of 13 September, instead of heading eastwards towards Afghanistan or Pakistan, it 
flew southeast, direct to Diego Garcia, arriving in the late afternoon. At that point, the aircraft 
disappears from known records, only to reappear two days later, on 15 September, heading from 
Cairo, Egypt to Rabat, Morocco. Where the aircraft flew between Diego Garcia and Cairo is 
unknown, although it is the only rendition-linked aircraft with known movement through Diego 
Garcia in September 2002. This is significant, as the British Government has admitted that a 
rendition flight with a detainee on board stopped over for refuelling on the island during September 
2002 (Milliband 2008). Given that it is unlikely that the aircraft was carrying a detainee from Athens 
to Diego Garcia, it is likely that it proceeded onwards from the island, picked up a detainee, and 
returned via Diego Garcia to North Africa. 
 
Given the geographical location of the island, this is logical stopover for renditions from Southeast 
Asia to North Africa (whereas a stopover from Pakistan, Afghanistan or the Middle East en route to 
North Africa does not make sense). As such, it is likely that the first rendition in this circuit was of a 
detainee being transferred from Southeast Asia to Egypt. It is also likely, given ƚŚĞ/ ?Ɛ
statement (CIA 2008) that one of the renditions through Diego Garcia was of a detainee being 
 ‘ƌĞƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽŚŝƐŚŽŵĞĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ ? ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞǁĂƐŐǇƉƚŝĂŶ ? 
 
Once in Egypt, N379P flew to Morocco on 15 September, and then onto Porto, Portugal (LPPR) on 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĚĂǇ ?dŚĞĂŝƌĐƌĂĨƚƐƚĂǇĞĚŽǀĞƌŶŝŐŚƚŝŶWŽƌƚŽ ?ůŝŬĞůǇĨŽƌƚŚĞƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĐƌĞǁƚŽŐĞƚƐŽŵĞ ‘ƌĞƐƚ
ĂŶĚƌĞůĂǆĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďĞĨŽƌĞƚŚĞŝƌƐĞĐŽŶĚƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝǀĞƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶĨůŝŐŚƚ ? On 17 September, the aircraft flew 
direct to Kabul, Afghanistan. Here, it picked up Binalshibh and Hassan bin Attash, both of whom had 
been transferred from Karachi to the Dark Prison in Kabul on 14 September. According to Amnesty 
International, bin Attash has told his lawyers that he was rendered from Afghanistan to Jordan in 
September 2002 alongside another detainee, Abu Otaibi Hadarami (AI 2006). N379P then flew from 
Kabul to Amman, Jordan, presumably with all three detainees on board. 
In Jordan, both bin Attash and Hadarami were transferred to GID detention, where they 
were tortured and interrogated for 16 months and 12 months respectively (AI 2006). There are 
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŝŶŐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨŝŶĂůƐŚŝďŚ ?ƐĨĂƚĞĂƚƚŚŝƐƉŽŝŶƚ ?KŶĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞŝŶ:ŽƌĚĂŶ has told Human 
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Rights Watch that he was held next to Binalshibh in the GID facility in Amman during late 2002, 
where Binalshibh had discussed being tortured by the Jordanians (HRW 2008). This would suggest 
that Binalshibh was taken off N379P along with bin Attash and Hadarami. However, authoritative 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚďǇƚŚĞW ?ƐĚĂŵ'ŽůĚŵĂŶ has Binalshibh being taken from Kabul to all the way to Rabat 
on 17 September 2002, where he was held for six months before being transferred again, to Poland 
(Goldman 2007).  
 
N379P left Jordan in the evening of 17 September, flying to Rabat, Morocco, probably with 
Binalshibh on board. Having completed all of its renditions, the aircraft then flew to Shannon, 
Ireland on 18 September, and then back to Johnston County via Washington on 19 September, 
landing in the early evening. 
 
Although UK authorities repeatedly denied that UK territory had been used during CIA renditions, 
once flight records were obtained and analysed, the UK was forced to admit that UK territory had 
been used. On-going analysis of the flight data may well prove that UK territory has been used for 
renditions much more frequently than on the two occasions admitted by the UK government.   
 
 
Sharing of intelligence with the US and other states which has led to the rendition and secret 
detention of detainees 
 
As well as allowing the use of its territory for rendition flights, the UK has shared intelligence with 
the CIA and other states which has then be used as the basis for renditions. One such case is that of 
Bisher al-Rawi and Jamil el-Banna, UK residents who were arrested by Gambian authorities on arrival 
in Banjul, detained and interrogated by US agents in the country, and then rendered to Afghanistan 
before being transferred on to Guantánamo Bay. Jamil el-Banna is a Jordanian-Palestinian with 
refugee status in the UK. Bisher al-Rawi is an Iraqi national who had been living in the UK since 1984, 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽƌƚƵƌĞŽĨŚŝƐĨĂƚŚĞƌďǇ^ĂĚĚĂŵ,ƵƐƐĞŝŶ ?ƐƐĞĐƌĞƚƉŽůŝĐĞ ?,ĞŽďƚĂŝŶĞĚ
British residency in 1985, and had indefinite leave to remain in the UK. 
During the 1990s, al-Rawi formed a friendship the Muslim cleric Abu Qatada, now known for being 
an outspoken man suspected of involvement with al Qaida. In 1996, al-Rawi was asked by Qatada to 
assist him as an interpreter at a meeting with British officials (al-Rawi assumes they were members 
of the police or intelligence services). In subsequent years he was called upon to act as a translator 
on an informal basis for British intelligence services. After 9/11 this relationship intensified, and al-
Rawi became the channel of communication between MI5 and Qatada. However, relations between 
al-Rawi and the Agency became increasingly strained, and ended just a few months before British 
authorities arrested Qatada in October 2002. 
On 1 November 2002, al-Rawi, el-Banna and a mutual friend Abdullah El Janoudi travelled together 
ƚŽ'ĂƚǁŝĐŬŝƌƉŽƌƚŽŶĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƚƌŝƉƚŽŵĞĞƚŝƐŚĞƌ ?ƐďƌŽƚŚĞƌ ?tĂŚĂďĂů-Rawi, in The Gambia. 
Together with another friend, Omar Omeri, the men had set up a joint venture to start a peanut-oil 
processing factory in The Gambia. However, the three men were arrested at the airport and 
detained under the Terrorism Act 2000. They were interrogated for four days at Paddington Police 
Station, with the ŽƐƚĞŶƐŝďůĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŝƌĂƌƌĞƐƚďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŽǀĞƌǇŽĨĂ ‘ƐƵƐƉĞĐƚĞůĞĐƚƌŽŶŝĐ
ĚĞǀŝĐĞ ?ŝŶĂů-ZĂǁŝ ?ƐůƵŐŐĂŐĞ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚh<'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐƌĞůĞĂƐĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐ
realm during the civil case brought against Jeppesen Dataplan in 2006
5
 include a telegram sent by 
                                                          
5
 The case, on behalf of al-Rawi and several other plaintiffs, including Binyam Mohamed, was aimed at securing damages 
from Jeppesen Dataplan for its complicity in the rendition and torture of the plaintiffs, since Jeppesen had providing flight 
planning services for the aircraft involved in their renditions. Ultimately, however, the case itself was not heard in court, 
ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞh^'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶĞĚ ?ĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŶŐ ‘ƐƚĂƚĞƐĞĐƌĞƚƐƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞ ?ĂŶĚĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞůŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚĚĂŵĂŐĞ
national security interests.  
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MI5 to the CIA, dated 1 November 2002 (MI5 2002b). This stated that al-Rawi ǁĂƐĂŶ ‘/ƐůĂŵŝĐ
ĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐƚ ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐĞŚĂĚƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĞĚ ‘ƐŽŵĞĨŽƌŵŽĨŚŽŵĞ-made electronic device. 
Preliminary inquiries including X-ray suggest that it may be a timing device or could possibly be used 
as some part of a car-based Improvised ElectronŝĐĞǀŝĐĞ ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŚĂĚ
clearly been following the men beforehand: six days earlier, on his way to The Gambia, Wahab al-
Rawi had been stopped and extensively questioned about the new business, and about Abu Qatada. 
Moreover, the luggage search was conducted covertly, authorised by a warrant signed by the Home 
Secretary. 
 
On or about 4 November, after four days of questioning, the men were released. The battery 
charger, which had apparently precipitated the arrest, was returned to al-Rawi. It was clear at this 
point that the device had been assessed as harmless; a position confirmed in a telegram from MI5 to 
MI6 and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on 11 November ?ǁŚŝĐŚƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐ ‘Ă
commercially available battery charger that had been modified by Bisher al-Rawi in order to make it 
ŵŽƌĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ? (MI5 2002a). However, this assessment was not passed onto the CIA. Instead, on 4 
November MI5 sent a telegram headed Travellers to Gambia, which asked the CIA to pass on the 
ŵĞŶ ?ƐƚƌĂǀĞůƉůĂŶƐƚŽƚŚĞ'ĂŵďŝĂŶŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚĞƚŚĞ'ĂŵďŝĂŶƐ ?ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ
back to MI5 (MI5 2002c) ?^ƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇ ?ƚŚĞƚĞůĞŐƌĂŵƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ ‘tĞǁŽƵůĚďĞŐƌĂƚĞĨƵůĨŽƌĨĞĞĚďĂĐŬ
on the reaction of the Gambians to this intelligence. In particular, we would be interested to learn if 
they are able to cover these individuals whilst they are in 'ĂŵďŝĂ ? ? 
 
On 8 November, the day that the three men attempted to travel to The Gambia for a second time 
(this time successfully), MI5 sent another telegram to the CIA. This one, headed Individuals 
Travelling to Gambia, provided the exact flight details, including the flight number and delayed take-
off time, and the names and dates of birth under which the three men were travelling (MI5 
2002d). Significantly, unlike the previous telegrams, this one did not include the caveat that the 
ŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚǁĂƐ ‘ĨŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽŶůǇĂŶĚŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐthe basis 
ĨŽƌŽǀĞƌƚ ?ĐŽǀĞƌƚŽƌĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
 
As soon as al-Rawi, el-Banna and El Janoudi arrived in Banjul, Gambia, they were arrested by 
Gambian agents, along with Wahab al-Rawi and Omar Omeri, who had come to meet them at the 
airport. According to the 2007 Intelligence and Security Committee (ISC) report on Rendition (ISC 
2007), there is no evidence that British intelligence intended the men to be arrested: 
 
It seems to us that there are a number of possible reasons why the men were initially 
arrested. It is possible that the Gambian police or border authorities at Banjul airport 
ĚĞĐŝĚĞĚƚŽƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŚĞŵĞŶďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂ “ŚƵŶĐŚ ? W something that happens routinely at 
customs and immigration points around the world. It is also possible that the Gambians 
broke tŚĞĐĂǀĞĂƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞƐŚĂƌĞĚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŵ ?ƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŶĚ
ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐƉƵƌƉŽƐĞƐŽŶůǇ ? ?ĂŶĚĐŚŽƐĞƚŽƚĂŬĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚĂƚ
ƚŚĞh^ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐŶĞŐůĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƉĂƐƐŽŶƚŚĞĐĂǀĞĂƚƐŽƌŝŶƐƚŝŐĂƚĞĚƚŚĞŵĞŶ ?ƐĂƌƌĞƐƚ
themsĞůǀĞƐ ?tŚĂƚĞǀĞƌƚŚĞƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞŵĞŶ ?ƐĂƌƌĞƐƚ ?ŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌƚŚĂƚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚĂƚƚŚĞ
instigation of the Security Service. 
 
Indeed, MI5 claim that they were only informed of the arrest on 10 November. The following day, 
they sent a telegram, headed Individuals Detained in Gambia, to MI6 and the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (MI5 2002a). This set out some background information on the men, and 
ƐƚĂƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞǁĂƐ ‘ƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐƵƉĚĂƚĞƐĨƌŽŵ ?Zd ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐ ?tĞǁŝůů
forward any further relevant information in due ĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ? The five men were initially taken to the 
Gambian National Intelligence Agency (GNIA) Headquarters. They were questioned for two hours by 
Gambian officials. The next morning, two Americans arrived and interrogated and photographed 
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each of the men. They remained at this location for two days before being transported to what their 
ĐĂƉƚŽƌƐƌĞĨĞƌƌĞĚƚŽĂƐĂ ‘ƐĂĨĞŚŽƵƐĞ ? ?ů-Rawi and El Janoudi were then returned to the GNIA 
ŚĞĂĚƋƵĂƌƚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚďĞĨŽƌĞĂůůĨŽƵƌǁĞƌĞƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŽĂƐĞĐŽŶĚ ‘ƐĂĨĞŚŽƵƐĞ ? ?dŚĞre they were held in 
separate holding cells which were very small and without windows. The second safe house was 
controlled by Americans, and they were interrogated by both Americans and Gambians. 
 
Omeri was released relatively quickly, while El Janoudi was kept for 26 days and Wahab al-Rawi for 
27 days. After a further two days, and despite habeas corpus proceedings pending in the Gambian 
courts, al-Rawi and el-Banna were driven to the airport at Banjul. Flight data and associated 
documentation demonstrate that al-Rawi and el-Banna were rendered from The Gambia to 
Afghanistan on 8-9 December, via refuelling stopover in Egypt, on board the CIA-owned Gulfstream 
V jet with registration number N379P. Flight planning services were provided by Jeppesen Dataplan, 
a subsidiary of Boeing Inc. which arranged the logistical details for numerous CIA rendition flights.  
dŚĞh< ?Ɛ Intelligence and Security Committee reported in 2007 that the CIA had told MI5 in late 
EŽǀĞŵďĞƌƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŝŶƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚĂ ‘ƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƚŽĚĞƚĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƚŚĞ
detainees to Bagram Airbase in Afghanistan (ISC 2007). According to the report, the Security Service 
 ‘ƌĞŐŝƐƚĞƌĞĚƐƚƌŽŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐ ?ďŽƚŚŽƌĂůůǇĂŶĚŝŶǁƌŝƚŝŶŐ ?ĂƚƚŚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂůĞƌƚĞĚƚŚĞ&K ? ?/Ŷ
response to these representations, as well as several made at the diplomatic level, the Americans 
declined to give the precise location of the detainees, saying only that there were good grounds for 




The presence of British intelligence agents and/or their participation in interrogations of victims 
who report torture, and the failure of those agents to act 
 
The case of Binyam Mohamed al-Habashi best illustrates the various ways in which UK intelligence 
agents have been present and participated in the interrogation of individuals that have been 
subjected to rendition, secret detention and torture, and have known that individuals have been 
tortured and have failed to act. Mohamed is an Ethiopian national who had been legally resident in 
the UK since 1994. He had travelled to Afghanistan in the summer of 2001, supposedly in an attempt 
to overcome a drug addiction. On 10 April 2002, he was arrested in Karachi Airport, Pakistan, while 
attempting to return to the UK. 
 
Pakistani immigration officers detained Mohamed at Karachi Airport for three days. On 13 April, he 
was transferred to Landi Prison, run by Pakistani prison officials, and held there for seven days. He 
was not interrogated or tortured in Landi. On 20 April, Mohamed was transferred to an interrogation 
centre run by Pakistani intelligence services (ICI) in Karachi, and was held there for three months. At 
ƚŚŝƐůŽĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĞǁĂƐŚĞůĚŝŶĂĐĞůů ?ŵǆ ? ? ?ŵ ?ĂŶĚŚƵŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŝůŝŶŐĨŽƌĂǁĞĞŬŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌĂƉƉĂĚŽ ?
position (wŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞ ?ƐĨĞĞƚďĂƌĞůǇƚŽƵĐŚƚŚĞŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?tŚŝůĞŝŶƚŚĞ//ĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇ ?DŽŚĂŵĞĚǁĂƐ
ŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞĚďǇĨŽƵƌ&/ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ƚŚƌĞĞŽĨǁŚŽŵǁĞƌĞŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚĂƐ ‘ŚƵĐŬ ? ? ‘dĞƌƌǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘:ĞŶŶǇ ? ?ƵƌŝŶŐ
their interrogations of Mohamed, they threatened him with torture by foreign security forces. 
According to ĂĚĞĐůĂƐƐŝĨŝĞĚǀĞƌƐŝŽŶŽĨDŽŚĂŵĞĚ ?ƐƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇƚŽŚŝƐůĂǁǇĞƌ ?ůŝǀĞ^ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚ^ŵŝƚŚ 
 ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĚŝŶƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ?ǁŚĞŶDŽŚĂŵĞĚǁĂƐƐƚŝůůŝŶ'ƵĂŶƚĄ ĂŵŽĂǇ ? ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŽƌ ‘ŚƵĐŬ ?
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚ P ‘/ĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƚĂůŬƚŽŵĞ ? ǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐƚŽ:ŽƌĚĂŶ ?tĞĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽǁŚĂƚǁĞǁĂŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƚŚĞ
WĂŬŝƐƚĂŶŝƐĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽĞǆĂĐƚůǇǁŚĂƚǁĞǁĂŶƚƚŚĞŵƚŽ ?dŚĞƌĂďƐǁŝůůĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚǇŽƵ ? ? ‘dĞƌƌǇ ?ĂůƐŽ
ƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶĞĚŚŝŵǁŝƚŚƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƚŽ/ƐƌĂĞůŽƌ:ŽƌĚĂŶ ?ĂŶĚĞǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐŚ P ‘dŚĞ^^ŬŶŽǁŚŽǁƚŽĚĞĂů
wŝƚŚƉĞŽƉůĞůŝŬĞǇŽƵ ? (Stafford-Smith 2005). 
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When the Americans were not present, Mohamed was beaten repeatedly with a leather strap. At 
ŽŶĞƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĂWĂŬŝƐƚĂŶŝƉƌĞƐƐĞĚĂŐƵŶŝŶƚŽŚŝƐĐŚĞƐƚĂŶĚǁĂŝƚĞĚ P ‘/ŬŶĞǁ/ǁĂƐŐŽŝŶŐƚŽĚŝĞ ?,ĞƐƚŽŽĚ
like that for five minutes. I looked into his eyes, and I saw my own fear reflected there. I had time to 
think about it. Maybe he will pull the trigger and I will not die, but be paralyzed. There was enough 
ƚŝŵĞƚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ ? ?ĨƚĞƌƚŚĂƚŝŶĐŝĚĞŶƚ ? ‘ŚƵĐŬ ?ĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞƌŽŽŵ ?ƐĂŝĚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?
but just stared at Mohamed. 
Mohamed claims that he was also interrogated by two MI6 officers, one of whom identified as 
 ‘:ŽŚŶ ? ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽDŽŚĂŵĞĚ P 
dŚĞǇŐĂǀĞŵĞĂĐƵƉŽĨƚĞĂǁŝƚŚĂůŽƚŽĨƐƵŐĂƌŝŶŝƚ ?/ŝŶŝƚŝĂůůǇŽŶůǇƚŽŽŬŽŶĞ ? ?EŽ ?ǇŽƵŶĞĞĚ
ĂůŽƚŵŽƌĞ ?tŚĞƌĞǇŽƵ ?ƌĞŐŽŝŶŐ ?ǇŽƵŶĞĞĚĂ ůŽƚŽĨƐƵŐĂƌ ? ?/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁĞǆĂĐƚůǇǁŚĂƚŚĞ
meant by this, but I figured he meant some poor country in Arabia. One of them did tell 
me I was going to get tortured by the Arabs. 
 
According to a heavily-ƌĞĚĂĐƚĞĚƌĞƉŽƌƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞůůŝŐĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ^ĞĐƵƌŝty Committee published 
in July 2007, MI6 had testified behind closed doors that it had had no contact with Mohamed at any 
point (ISC 2007). MI5, however, did admit that one of its officers interrogated him while in Karachi, 
ďƵƚ ‘ĚĞŶŝĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌƚŽůĚĂů-,ĂďĂƐŚŝ ?DŽŚĂŵĞĚ ?ŚĞǁŽƵůĚďĞƚŽƌƚƵƌĞĚ ? ?/ŶƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚ
ŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐh<ĐŽŵƉůŝĐŝƚǇŝŶDŽŚĂŵĞĚ ?ƐƚŽƌƚƵƌĞ ?ƚŚĂƚŽĨĨŝĐĞƌďĞĐĂŵĞŬŶŽǁŶĂƐtŝƚŶĞƐƐ
 ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽƚĞƐƚŝŵŽŶǇŚĞĂƌĚďǇƚŚĞŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ? ‘ƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?tŝƚŶĞƐƐ ?ƌĞƉŽƌƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞĚŝĚŶŽƚ
observe any abuse and that no instances of abuse were mentioned by al-,ĂďĂƐŚŝ ? ? 
 
However, court documents since released demonstrate that MI5 in general  W and almost certainly 
Witness B in particular  W ǁĞƌĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨDŽŚĂŵĞĚ ?ƐŵŝƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚďǇƚŚĞh^ŝŶ 
Pakistan, before tŝƚŶĞƐƐƚƌĂǀĞůůĞĚƚŽWĂŬŝƐƚĂŶƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚĞŚŝŵ ?dŚŝƐ ?DŽŚĂŵĞĚ ?ƐůĂǁǇĞƌƐŚĂǀĞ
argued, amounts to British complicity in his mistreatment. A summary of the 42 classified CIA 
ĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚƐŚĂŶĚĞĚƚŽD/ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚŝŶŐDŽŚĂŵĞĚ ?ƐƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚŝŶ a High Court decision 
concerning Binyam Mohamed v Secretary of State in August 2008 (UK 2009). However, this section 
of the decision  W which ran to seven short paragraphs  W was redacted from the open judgement on 
request by the Foreign Secretary, citing national security concerns. Further legal action eventually 
saw the decision to redacted these findings overturned, and in February 2010 the paragraphs were 
released as an annex to a judgement by the Court of Appeal which dismissed an attempt by the 
Foreign Secretary to keep them classified (UK 2010). They read: 
 
It was reported [to the Court] that a new series of interviews was conducted by the 
United States authorities prior to 17 May 2002 as part of a new strategy designed by an 
expert interviewer. 
v) It was reported that at some stage during that further interview process by the United 
States authorities, BM [Mohamed] had been intentionally subjected to continuous sleep 
deprivation. The effects of the sleep deprivation were carefully observed. 
vi) It was reported that combined with the sleep deprivation, threats and inducements 
were made to him. His fears of being removed from United States custody and 
"disappearing" were played upon 
vii) It was reported that the stress brought about by these deliberate tactics was 
increased by him being shackled in his interviews 
viii) It was clear not only from the reports of the content of the interviews but also from 
the report that he was being kept under self-harm observation, that the interviews were 
having a marked effect upon him and causing him significant mental stress and suffering 
ix) We regret to have to conclude that the reports provided to the SyS [security services] 
made clear to anyone reading them that BM was being subjected to the treatment that 
we have described and the effect upon him of that intentional treatment 
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x) The treatment reported, if had been administered on behalf of the United Kingdom, 
would clearly have been in breach of the undertakings given by the United Kingdom in 
1972. Although it is not necessary for us to categorise the treatment reported, it could 
readily be contended to be at the very least cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by 
the United States authorities. 
 
It should come as no surprise that the foreign secretary sought to suppress this evidence, given that 
when questioned by the Foreign Affairs Select Committee in December 2005, he had categorically 
denied that that the UK intelligence officer who saw Mohamed had observed any abuse (UK 2005). 
^ƚƌĂǁ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞƵŶƚƌƵĞ ?tŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚĐůĞĂƌŝƐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŚŝƐĚĞŶŝĂůǁĂƐĂůŝĞ ?ĂŶĚŚĞŬŶĞǁ
what the reports to the Security Services contained, or whether Straw himself had been misled by 
the Security Services. This illustrates the challenges of unpicking who knew what and when in cases 
where organisations of the state are colluding in denial.  
 
On 19 July, after three months in the ICI facility, Mohamed was transferred by air to Islamabad, on 
board a civilian flight. On landing, he was transferred to a cell at a Special Branch facility until the 
evening of 21 July. At about 10pm that evening, he was taken to what he describes as a military 
airport in Islamabad with two other detainees. This is likely to have been the Pakistani Air Force base 
at Nur Khan / Chakala, which is co-ůŽĐĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ/ƐůĂŵĂďĂĚ ?ƐĞŶĂǌŝƌŚƵƚƚŽ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƌƉŽƌƚ ?
There he ǁĂƐƚƵƌŶĞĚŽǀĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŵĞƌŝĐĂŶƐ ?ĂŶĚƐƵďũĞĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ/ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĨŽƌ
carrying out a rendition. He was stripped naked, photographed, searched, had a suppository 
inserted into his anus, and was then dressed in a tracksuit, shackled, blindfolded, had ear defenders 
placed over his head, and was strapped to the seat of an aircraft. Flight data and associated 
documentation demonstrate that Mohamed and the two other detainees were transferred on 
board the CIA-owned Gulfstream V jet with registration number N379P. The aircraft departed 
Pakistan in the evening of 21 July, and flew direct to Rabat, in Morocco, arriving in the early hours of 
22 July.  
 
For 18 months, between 22 July 2002 and 21 January 2004, Binyam Mohamed was held and tortured 
in Morocco.
7
 According to Mohamed, the questions asked during his interrogations in Morocco 
ĐŽƵůĚŽŶůǇŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵƌŝƚŝƐŚ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ^ĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŝŶǀĞƐƚŝŐĂƚŝŽŶďǇƚŚĞh< ?Ɛ
Intelligence and Security Committee, published in heavily-redacted form in July 2007, included 
testimony from the Security Services stating that, other than Witness B in Pakistan, no other British 
agent had contact with Mohamed during his secret detention, and that UK intelligence was unaware 
that he had been transferred to Morocco (ISC 2007) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝƚĚŝĚĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ ‘ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ
reasonable probability that intelligence passed to the Americans was used in al-,ĂďĂƐŚŝ ?Ɛ
ƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌƌŽŐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
 
In the evening of 21 January 2004, Binyam Mohamed was handed over to the Americans and 
subjeĐƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ/ ?ƐƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?,ĞǁĂƐƚŚĞŶƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚŽŶďŽĂƌĚ the CIA-
owned Boeing 737 with tail number N313P, and flown direct to Kabul, Afghanistan. Once in 
ĨŐŚĂŶŝƐƚĂŶ ?DŽŚĂŵĞĚǁĂƐƉůĂĐĞĚŝŶĂƚƌƵĐŬĂŶĚĚƌŝǀĞŶƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĂƌŬWƌŝƐŽŶ ? ?Ăsecret CIA prison just 
outside Kabul. He was held here for about four months, until late May 2004, and subjected to 
repeated interrogations and torture by the CIA.  
 
/ŶDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ?ŝŶǇĂŵDŽŚĂŵĞĚǁĂƐƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌƌĞĚďǇŚĞůŝĐŽƉƚĞƌǁŝƚŚŽƚŚĞƌĚĞƚĂŝŶĞĞƐ ? ‘ƚŝĞĚůŝŬe hens 
ŐŽŝŶŐĨŽƌƐůĂƵŐŚƚĞƌ ? ?ŽŶĂĨůŝŐŚƚůĂƐƚŝŶŐ ? ?-30 minutes. He was blindfolded and had head phones 
placed over his head for the duration of the flight. Three of the detainees held in the Dark Prison 
                                                          
7
 &ŽƌĂĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŝŶǇĂŵDŽŚĂŵŵĞĚ ?ƐũŽƵƌŶĞǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞŐůŽďĂůƌĞŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĚĞƚĂŝůƐŽĨƚŚĞ




with Binyam Mohamed  W al-Sharqawi, bin Attash and al-Kazimi  W were also transferred from Bagram 
Airbase to Guantánamo Bay with him in September 2004. This suggests that these were at least 
some of the men transferred alongside Mohamed in May 2004. 
From May to September 2004, Binyam Mohamed was held at Bagram, and describes being 
subjected to further interrogations and being forced to sign a confession. On 19 September 2004, 
Binyam Mohamed was flown with eight other detainees - including bin Attash, al-Sharqawi and al-
Kazimi - to Guantánamo Bay on a US military aircraft with call-sign RCH948y. While held in 
Guantánamo, Binyam Mohammed continued to suffer mistreatment in the forms of beatings and 
denial of medical care. Binyam Mohamed was finally released from Guantánamo Bay, back to the UK 




The UK government has repeatedly claimed that it unreservedly condemns torture or other cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment, and that it in no ways condones or facilitates its 
use. It also repeatedly used various denial devices to cover up both its involvement and it knowledge 
of the wider workings of the global rendition system. Yet through an analysis of the that system, 
largely illuminated by mining the flight data relating to those aircraft involved in rendition, alongside 
the testimony gathered by human rights organisations and investigative journalism, the evidence 
shows that the UK has been involved in a whole raft of rendition-related activities that violate 
numerous obligations under international human rights law. The evidence also shows that the UK 
has played an active role in orchestrating and facilitating renditions to countries where it knew there 
was a risk of torture, that it has actively participated in intelligence sharing which has led to 
renditions to torture, that it has encourage intelligence agencies in of other states in using torture, 
by using them as a conduit for its own intelligence gathering activities, and that it has repeatedly 
turned a blind eye when it has witnessed torture or the effects of torture on detainees, or when it 
has been explicitly told that torture took place. Many of these things were going on well before UK 
officials deployed various techniques to deny UK involvement. Finally, the UK has repeatedly failed 
to report cases of torture and other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment to the 
appropriate authorities, despite obligations to do so under international law. Proving that UK agents 
actively participated in interrogations that involved torture is almost impossible. But by examining 
its role in the wider architecture of the global rendition system, it is much easier to mount a 
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